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I present a theoretical framework and analytic strategy for the study of place as a fundamental 
context in criminology, with a focus on neighborhood effects.  My approach builds on research 
over the past 15 years from the Project on Human Development in Chicago Neighborhoods and a 
recent book unifying the results.  I argue that “ecometrics” can be applied at multiple scales and I 
elaborate core principles and guiding hypotheses for five problems: (1) legacies of inequality and 
developmental neighborhood effects; (2) race, crime, and the new diversity; (3) cognition and 
context, above all the social meaning of disorder; (4) the measurement and sources of collective 
efficacy in a cosmopolitan world; and (5) higher-order structures beyond the neighborhood that 
arise in complex urban systems.  Although conceptually distinct, these hard problems are 
interdependent and ultimately linked to a frontier in criminology: contextual causality.   
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The thesis I advance in this address is that place—especially as manifested in neighborhoods—is 
a fundamental context that has widespread effects on crime, perceptions of order and disorder, 
well-being, and much more, including the social organization of the contemporary metropolis.  
In a recently published book, Great American City: Chicago and the Enduring Neighborhood 
Effect (Sampson 2012), I introduced this thesis by asking the reader to imagine the very 
opposite—“placelessness” and the alleged “death of distance” in an increasingly flat world.    
  On a first try such a world is easy to picture because it confronts us every day.  
Technology seduces us to transcend place and indeed the streets are filled with people plugged in 
to anywhere but where they are. If our devices allow us to be elsewhere, aren’t the particularities 
of our somewhere irrelevant?  The globalization of culture and travel are pervasive, further 
eroding local boundaries.  We have also been told, for some time now, that traditional forms of 
community have withered away under the assault of globalization, technological change, and 
urbanization. By these accounts, the local, place, neighborhood—they do sound a bit quaint. 
  But something is amiss in this picture.  While globalization and technological advances 
are real, the world is profoundly uneven and inequality by place is itself ubiquitous.  In a 
seeming paradox, for example, the data reveal that neighborhood segregation by income has 
increased, not decreased, along with globalization (Fry and Taylor 2012; Reardon and Bischoff 
2011). Commitment to community is also found and argued about in cities everywhere.  Whether 
by race, sexual orientation, or social status, identities of place motivate action across the political 
spectrum, even in our most global of cities. As the urban theorist Manual Castells (2000: 697) 
puts it, “most of New York, in fact most of Manhattan, is very local, not global.”  
To experience the diversity and distinctiveness of contemporary neighborhoods up close, 
in the first chapter of the book I take the reader on a walk down the streets of Chicago and        
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describe the varied scenes.  I begin in the sparkling “Magnificent Mile” just off the Gold Coast 
and then walk south through the high-rise Loop, the gentrifying Near South Side, an empty field 
formerly the ill-famed Robert Taylor Homes, racially integrated Hyde Park, a Woodlawn slum 
cheek by jowl with middle class renewal, and stable working-class neighborhoods.  I then zoom 
out to a city-wide view of Chicago over multiple decades.  I show that clustering by 
neighborhood and community takes in a broad sweep of sometimes disparate social phenomena. 
Whether crime, poverty, infant health, protest, civic engagement, leadership networks, or 
collective efficacy, the city is ordered by a spatial logic (“placed”) and yields differences as 
much today as a century ago.  Neighborhoods are always changing, but their relative position or 
place in the status hierarchy of the city is remarkably persistent over time.  
My street-level observations combined with a temporal view of Chicago from above 
highlight three interrelated facts: The first is neighborhood concentration and hence the spatial 
inequality of everyday life. The second is the tendency of diverse social phenomena to cluster 
together in space—“things go together.”  The third is persistence despite change, or more 
generally the neighborhood-level social structure of the city.  I go on to articulate an overarching 
theory of context and neighborhood effects, backed by empirical results from 15 years of 
research in Chicago.    
I seek here to build on this framework. I begin by briefly and selectively reviewing the 
theoretical principles, methodological strategy, and findings in Great American City (Sampson, 
2012).  I paint the big picture in broad strokes, consistent with the nature of a Presidential 
Address.
1  My main objective, however, is to look forward.  Framed by the book’s theory and 
findings but pushing ahead, I pose areas of research and unresolved questions that constitute 
                                                 
1. For purposes of overview and synthesis, I draw mainly from chapters 3 and 15 in Sampson (2012). 
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frontiers in our field—what we might think of as criminology’s “hard problems.”
2  Let me be 
clear: Mine is not another claim of the “crisis of criminology.”
3 Although hard, the problems and 
puzzles I define are potentially solvable and that is what makes them, and the field, exciting. I 
thus offer this address not as a critique of past research, but in a generative spirit, one that 
reaches for new ideas, guiding hypotheses, and an agenda for moving criminology forward.
4     
 
PRINCIPLES OF INQUIRY AND CORE CONCEPTS  
The great student of the city Lewis Mumford once said, “Neighborhoods, in some primitive, 
inchoate fashion exist wherever human beings congregate” (1954: 258).   Half a century later the 
archaeologist Michael Smith agrees. Based on research around the world, Smith (2010: 137) 
argues that the “spatial division of cities into districts or neighborhoods is one of the few 
universals of urban life from the earliest cities to the present.”  The salience of neighborhood 
difference has persisted across long time scales and historical eras despite the transformation of 
speciﬁc boundaries, political regimes, and the layout of cities.  The consistency of neighborhood 
differentiation from ancient cities to contemporary Chicago suggests that spatial inequality is an 
enduring mechanism that constitutes a fundamental organizing dimension of human behavior. 
 
                                                 
2. In the conclusion I return to the idea of “hard problems” and its ultimate charge as famously set out by 
the mathematician David Hilbert over a century ago.  Unlike Hilbert, however, I do not seek to lay out all 
the problems of the discipline. My selections are framed in light of my overarching concern with context. 
 
3. Each generation of criminologists seems to identify a different crisis, a common intellectual tradition 
across disciplines.  Over forty years ago, for example, Gouldner (1970) warned of the “Coming Crisis in 
Western Sociology.”  Depending on the observer, sociology has been in crisis ever since or well before 
Gouldner’s attack.  The point is that crisis is not the same as deep intellectual challenges.  Quite the 
opposite—an intellectual discipline without hard problems is complacent and boring. 
 
4. For this reason, I dedicate my address to younger scholars, especially graduate students.  More than 
most, you are the future and well poised to make the next set of breakthroughs.        
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In Great American City (GAC) I therefore reject intellectual moves toward placelessness 
and revised traditional “bottom-up approaches” (it’s all the individual) and “top-down” 
approaches (it’s all structure) to argue that neighborhoods are not merely the settings in which 
individuals enact autonomous decisions or follow preset scripts, and that neighborhoods are not 
merely empty vessels determined by external or global forces. I argue instead that neighborhood 
contexts are important determinants of the quantity and quality of human behavior in their own 
right. I also argue that differentiation by neighborhood is not only everywhere to be seen, but that 
it is has durable properties with effects that span a wide variety of social phenomena. I thus 
expand the traditional focus of neighborhood effects on individuals to examine a family of 
neighborhood effects across multiple units of analysis, outcomes, and time scales.  In making this 
intellectual move, the idea of neighborhood effects commands a broader scope, ranging from 
individual cognition and perceptions to the higher-order social structure of the city.   
My argument is guided by ten overarching principles that motivated a series of specific 
hypotheses and empirical tests.  I believe these general principles can motivate new 
criminological inquiry as well.  The first principle is the most basic:  
(1) Relentlessly focus on context, especially concentrated neighborhood inequality and 
social stratification by place.   
(2) Study neighborhood-level variations in their own right and adopt a systematic method 
of data collection that relies on multiple methods with public standards of measurement— 
metrics for ecology or what Stephen Raudenbush and I called “ecometrics.”  
(3) Focus on social-interactional, social-psychological, organizational, and cultural 
mechanisms of city life rather than just individual attributes or traditional compositional features 
like racial makeup and class—in short, social mechanisms that link cause and effect.  In the book        
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I focus mainly on collective efficacy, perceptions of disorder, legal cynicism, social altruism and 
organizational capacity as key theoretical concepts that in different ways explain crime rates. 
(4) Study dynamic processes of neighborhood structural change. 
(5) Simultaneously assess mechanisms of social reproduction and cultural continuity.   
(6) Embed in the study of neighborhood dynamics the role of individual selection, both 
its contextual sources and social consequences (or macro outcomes).   I claim that what we 
typically think of as selection “bias” is misguided—selection is a neighborhood effect. 
(7) At the same time, go beyond both the individual and the local to examine spatial 
mechanisms that cross neighborhood boundaries.  Spatial disadvantage, not just internal 
neighborhood characteristics, is important for understanding a neighborhood’s crime rate. 
(8) Further yet, study the social and cultural organization of the metropolis as a whole, 
including higher-order structures that create cross-cutting links beyond spatially proximate 
neighborhoods.  
(9) Never lose sight of human concerns with public affairs and the improvement of city 
life—develop implications for community-level interventions. I argue for place-based 
interventions as a principled alternative to people-based approaches to reducing crime. 
(10) Last, but not least, emphasize theoretically motivated and interpretive empirical 
research while taking a pluralistic stance on the nature of evidence needed to assess social 
causation—what I eventually came to call “contextual causality.”   
THE CHICAGO PROJECT 
  Based on these principles of theory and method, I developed a number of more explicit 
hypotheses and strategies that were explored in what I called the Chicago Project.  By the latter I 
mean a number of connected studies, all of which focus on Chicago circa the late 20th and early        
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21st centuries. The effort that unites them and the empirical base of the book is the “Project on 
Human Development in Chicago Neighborhoods” (PHDCN), an original longitudinal study of 
children, families, and neighborhoods in what is one of the most American cities and thus 
representative at heart—a microcosm for the study of urban contexts.
 5   But the PHDCN 
contains multiple components that in turn spawned cognate studies with independent intellectual 
standing and that I integrated and expanded; hence the name “Chicago Project.”  The project has 
the following key features, the first three of which represent the core activities of PHDCN: 
  • A longitudinal cohort study of approximately 6,200 children and families followed 
wherever they moved in the United States for up to seven years. 
• A representative community survey of more than 8,000 Chicago residents in 1995 and 
another survey in 2002 of over 3,000 residents. 
  • A systematic social observational study (through videotaping) of more than 20,000 
street segments in a sample of neighborhoods purposely chosen to vary by race/ethnicity and 
SES, along with a follow-up observational study by raters seven years later across the entire city. 
  • A Network Panel Study of more than 2,800 key leaders in forty-seven communities, 
interviewed in 1995 and again in a 2002 follow-up of over 1,000 leaders. 
  • A study of more than 4,000 collective action events in the Chicago metropolitan area 
from 1970 to 2000. 
  • A “field experiment” in 2002 and 2010 designed to measure community-level 
differences in the propensity of people in public settings to mail back “lost letters.” 
  These data sources were combined with archival records on crime, violence, health (e.g., 
mortality, birth weight, and teenage pregnancy), housing, community organizations, and a wealth 
                                                 
5. Chapter 4 in the book describes in detail the history of PHDCN, its design and data collection, and the 
many unselfish individuals whose long-term commitment of labor made the project succeed.   
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of population characteristics from the U.S. Census across several decades.  I also spent many 
years observing and thinking about Chicago during my daily rounds, and I conducted interviews 
with community leaders up to 2008.   
  In short, Great American City integrates the study of neighborhood structural inequality, 
social and cultural mechanisms, spatial dynamics, and the higher-order structures of the city.  
Hence a disclaimer: Mine is not a theory of crime per se. But this may be an advantage given the 
surfeit of crime causation theories in criminology. I offer instead a theory of context that is 
broadly applicable to multiple social outcomes, with a crime a leading test case (Sampson, 2012: 
355).   Having outlined the project’s contours, I turn now to a discussion of how the book’s 
concepts and strategies can address some of criminology’s hard problems and formulate new 
questions.  But first it is necessary to address my conception of place and definition of 
neighborhood.  The latter is often said to be the oldest problem in neighborhood research.  
 
THE IDEA OF NEIGHBORHOOD   
Almost a century ago, the sociologist Roderick McKenzie stated: “Probably no other term is 
used so loosely or with such changing content as the term neighborhood, and very few concepts 
are more difficult to define” (McKenzie 1921: 344-345). Since then hundreds of operational 
definitions have been proposed but the perceived problem continues.  Indeed, it is not uncommon 
to find hand-wringing over the “right” operational definition of neighborhood and skirmishes 
among devotees of competing units of analysis.  Some go for big units (e.g., community areas, 
health districts, cities even) while others want them small, like block groups or census blocks.  A 
recent move argues for even smaller or “micro places,” as small as a street corner or a house 
(Weisburd et al. 2012).  Most researchers are pragmatic and go for census tracts, a workhorse of        
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neighborhood effects research for generations and for good reason—the availability of decades 
of detailed census data at the tract level yields an enormous treasure trove.   
I argue, however, that the empirical search for the correct operational definition of 
neighborhood or place is misplaced. For one thing, the concept of place ranges over units big and 
small.  Merriam-Webster’s dictionary, for example, defines place to include areas as small as a 
building or as large as “a particular region” or “center of population.”
6  Thus Chicago is a place, 
but so is the Hyde Park community surrounding the University of Chicago, and within that 
“Jimmy’s,” a wonderful watering hole at East 55
th and S. Woodlawn.  
The phenomenon of crime does not privilege any one type of place or ecological unit 
either.  Crime varies within societies, states, counties, cities and certainly within neighborhoods, 
whether measured at the level of census tracts or even block groups.  But crime varies within 
smaller places too—most apartments on a high burglary street are not burglarized, for example.  
Within an apartment complex, crime risk varies by apartment, and so on almost like an infinite 
regress problem.  Internal variance thus does not logically imply that a lower (micro) level is 
inherently better than a higher (macro) level.  Why Chicago is more violent than say, Stockholm 
Sweden is just as important a question as why violence differs by places within a neighborhood.   
I also argue that how micro places are perceived or reacted to by residents and authorities 
alike is conditioned by the larger context.  A vacant house in one neighborhood can evoke 
reactions very different than in another neighborhood—as I will turn to later, the meaning of 
disorder is shaped by its surrounding context.  In particular, micro places and even conventional 
neighborhoods are nested within larger communities that are recognized or named by residents, 
external housing buyers, and institutional actors such as real estate agents and administrative 
                                                 
6. http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/place. 
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agencies such as the police. These larger-scale perceptual, organizational, and political factors 
govern how reactions at the more micro level unfold.  Razing a drug house or closing a rowdy 
bar is a complex act, for example, that is about much more than the place itself.  It matters what 
neighborhood the house or bar is in—what “kinds of people” reside there, what the zoning laws 
are, how vocal the residents are, and how decision-makers view the area. 
Equally important and related is the symbolic power or idea of neighborhood.  While 
social scientists quibble over empirical definitions and clear boundaries, citizens make decisions 
and render opinions every day based on broad perceptions and imagined neighborhoods, which 
in turn have real consequences. Novelists, artists, news columnists, and outside observers of all 
political stripes also use the term “neighborhood” not to signify neat quantified definitions so 
much as to reflect symbolic differences inscribed in space (Gieryn 2000).
7   
Place is thus a fluid rather than fixed concept, but research has to start somewhere.  In my 
own criminological research I have examined primarily cities, communities, and neighborhoods, 
with the latter taking up my current focus.  In that work I conceptualize neighborhood in 
theoretical terms as a geographic and hence ecological section of a larger community or region 
that usually contains residents or institutions and that has socially distinctive characteristics. This 
definition highlights the general characteristic of neighborhoods from ancient cities to the 
present—they are embedded analytic units with simultaneous social and spatial significance. An 
empirical implication follows—if there is no differentiation (or clustering) by social 
characteristics based on the proposed geography, there is no neighborhood in the socially 
                                                 
7. Appropriation of the idea of neighborhood does not favor any ideological side.  As a historian of the 
city has argued, the “language of neighborhood communalism is a place where traditional distinctions 
among left, liberal, and right often blur or even crumble” (Looker 2012: 577).  Thus segregationists 
defend “pure” neighborhoods while anarchists or radicals claim utopian ideals.  Even Norman Mailer got 
in on the act, running for mayor of New York City under the campaign of “Neighborhood Power.”  The 
city and neighborhood are also surprisingly central to much of English literature (Jaye and Watts 1981). 
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meaningful sense.  The evidence is in: Research has consistently demonstrated considerable 
social inequality across multiple levels of neighborhood analysis (Sampson 2012: chapter 2, 5).   
The apparent problem of defining neighborhood is thus amenable to solution: Ecometrics 
(principle 2) is applicable or scalable to multiple levels of place, negating the perceived need for 
a single definition.
8   Moreover, I define social characteristics (e.g., local ties, perceptions) 
separately from the unit of analysis.  Similar to Janowitz’s (1967) concept of the community of 
limited liability, traditional “neighborhoodness” in the form of tight-knit ties among neighbors is 
not necessary to define a neighborhood (and in any case is rare).  Note further that 
neighborhoods of residence are but one concern—neighborhoods of work and play are relevant 
too.   This pragmatic conceptualization allows empirical research to proceed without tautology 
and it offers a menu of options for measuring theoretical constructs across place-based units of 
analysis. Depending on the question, large or small units may be relevant (Hipp 2007).
9  And 
like assumptions in a theoretical model, definitions of neighborhood are almost always 
unrealistic or “wrong,” but they are more or less useful in generating insights about the world 
and yielding testable empirical predictions. 
“BIG DATA” AND THE TECHNOLOGY CHALLENGE  
  There is more good news.  Advances in technology said to undermine community are 
instead providing us with increased geographical flexibility and power to measure social 
characteristics across multiple spatial scales. Mobile phone apps have created a flood of new 
geo-referenced data on everything from potholes to crime (Giles 2012), and the technology 
                                                 
8. Raudenbush and Sampson (1999) examine ecometric strategies and statistical properties more formally 
by various levels of ecological aggregation and measurement source. 
 
9. In the PHDCN, I have relied primarily on census block groups, tracts, neighborhood clusters of census 
tracts that are socially and ecologically similar, and community areas, which in Chicago are socially and 
symbolically distinctive areas about 38,000 residents on average (Sampson, 2012: Chapter 3).   
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giants Google and Apple are competing intensely over none other than maps. The “Boston Area 
Research Initiative” (BARI) is an example of a recent effort to capitalize on technological 
advances to spur original research on neighborhoods and increase collaborations between 
government agencies and academics.
10 Combined with advances in GPS digital mapping from 
the communications revolution (e.g., tracing the physical movement of individuals through cell-
phone usage), spatial statistics and mapping tools,
11 and new measures of routine activities in 
time and space such as time budgets (Wikström et al. 2012), the possibilities are extensive for 
creating rich databases of neighborhood and other place-based contexts. 
Visual criminology is also in ascendance.  One of the world’s most powerful companies 
in effect implemented PHDCN SSO procedures for observing public spaces. Google’s “Street 
View” advertises itself by showing a car with a video camera sticking out the top (ours was 
hidden, and we did not advertise). Their vehicles have roamed many of the world’s cities with 
impressive results. Although lacking investigator control and SSO precision, Google Street View 
can be and is being used to systematically code a variety of urban street scenes, right down to the 
level of speciﬁc places. As shown in the work of scholars like Candice Odgers, rapid progress is 
being made in the visual measurement of neighborhood contexts, again at multiple scales (e.g., 
Odgers et al. 2012).  I believe that ecometrics is a unifying idea that has the potential to leverage 
the GIS, visual, and technology revolutions and help transform how we conduct contextual 
research in the challenge of a data-rich environment— “big data meets ecometrics” as it were. 
                                                 
10. See http://www.bostonarearesearchinitiative.net/. 
 
11. The geostatistical method of “kriging” is especially relevant to the neighborhood boundary issue. 
Smooth surfaces can be created that are not limited to pre-defined definitions like census tracts.  Block-
level estimates can be reassembled into any configuration desired by the researcher (Bader and Alshire In 
press). 
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Measurement will only take us so far, of course—one can have big data and small ideas.  
How we integrate our methods with pressing questions is the real challenge. For the remainder of 
this address I address what I consider five substantive problems facing criminology: (1) legacies 
of inequality and developmental neighborhood effects; (2) race, crime, and the new diversity; (3) 
cognition and context, including the role of social meaning; (4) the measurement and sources of 
collective efficacy; and (5) extra-local neighborhood effects (“higher-order structures”) that arise 
in complex urban systems.  While conceptually distinct, these problems are interdependent and 
ultimately linked to the idea of contextual causality. 
 
LEGACIES: CONNECTING PAST TO PRESENT 
Pierre Bourdieu began his seminal essay on social capital with a broad observation: “The social 
world is accumulated history” (1986: 241).  A key theme of Great American City is the historical 
persistence of key forms of social inequality despite massive social change.  Consider the 
profound changes that have occurred over the last 50 years, from riots, population hemorrhaging 
of central cities, deindustrialization, economic expansion and crime increases in the 1960s to 
1970s, to the large increases in immigration, mass incarceration, gentrification, housing boom 
and crime drop near century’s end, to the intensifying globalization and economic collapse of the  
Great Recession.  Through all this neighborhoods remained surprisingly “sticky” in character 
and largely maintained their place in the pecking order of the city. For example, the poorest 
neighborhood in Chicago in 1960 was still the poorest neighborhood 40 years later, and during 
the great crime decline of the late 1990s and into the 2000s, communities with the highest 
violence rates remained so (Sampson 2012: Chapter 5).  At the other end of the spectrum, the        
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Gold Coast of the 1920s (Zorbaugh 1929) is still the Gold Coast.  It is not that neighborhoods 
never change, but that they change and reproduce themselves in highly structured ways. 
  Hard problem # 1, then, is this: how does the past affect the present? I submit that we do 
not understand this process well when it comes to context.  Criminology is not alone. Orlando 
Patterson (2004) has argued that one of the great unsolved puzzles in the social sciences is what 
accounts for strong continuities in social environments. He argues that the dominant focus on 
change, while central, has obscured the systematic theoretical probing of large-scale historical 
and cultural continuities. Although he focuses primarily on societies, Patterson’s thesis strikes a 
chord with the literature in community and neighborhood crime studies.  Analogous to the 
persistence of individual differences, we need to ask, why do “criminogenic” contexts reappear 
time and time again?  Legacies of neighborhood inequality and the explanation of persistently 
high crime areas, in particular, demand our renewed attention. 
  There is no simple answer or strategy but I posit a number of mechanisms to explain 
legacies of inequality.  Based on principles 1 and 3-5, these include perceived disorder as a 
mechanism that socially reproduces neighborhood inequality (to which I return later), hierarchy 
maintenance and negative neighborhood reputation (stigma), and legal cynicism. I also analyze 
contextual sources of residential mobility and how neighborhood selection reinforces inequality, 
such that what we typically view as selection bias is in fact a kind of neighborhood effect.   
Overall, I take a life-course perspective at the macro-level, focusing simultaneously on processes 
of stability and change.  The key to this move is not just to model change, for which we have 
excellent methods, but to get at the mechanisms that link the past to the present.
12  
                                                 
12.  The crime rate of a neighborhood 20 years ago does not directly explain its current rate, for example, 
just as an individual’s criminality in the past does not directly cause the present.  Some readers will recall 
an earlier literature at the individual level on population heterogeneity versus state dependence.  Although        
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 DEVELOPMENTAL AND INTERGENERATIONAL EFFECTS 
  A major dimension of the legacy issue concerns neighborhood effects on individuals that 
develop over time.  In research from the PHDCN we found that childhood exposure to severely 
disadvantaged communities was linked to diminished verbal ability later in childhood, a lasting 
negative effect that continues even after moving out of the neighborhood.  Specifically, living in 
concentrated disadvantage depresses the rate of verbal learning by about four “IQ” points, which 
is roughly equivalent to missing a year of school.  This is a lagged effect of context, one that has 
implications for how we understand the legacy of neighborhood effects.   
  Recent work by scholars such as Patrick Sharkey has also uncovered important time-
varying and intergenerational effects: The key finding is that neighborhood effects depend not 
only on where individuals live today, but on where they lived in the past and where their parents 
lived (Sampson et al. 2008; Sharkey 2008; Wodtke et al. 2011).  Sharkey (2013), in particular, 
finds that since the 1970s, a majority of black families have resided in the poorest quarter of 
neighborhoods in consecutive generations, compared to only 7 percent of white families.  This 
body of research renders invalid the usual strategy in criminology to study current neighborhood 
conditions while controlling for characteristics such as family supervision, achievement, and 
employment that instead may be outcomes of past neighborhood deprivation.  In a very real 
sense we can say that neighborhood inequality is socially “inherited.”  
  In short, while intergenerational family research is well established in criminology, we 
need research on inter and multi-generational neighborhood effects along with study of  the 
cumulative effects of the past in explaining current inequality (see also Mare 2011).  Such a 
move would help get to the bottom of what in the book I call “developmental neighborhood 
                                                                                                                                                           
similar issues arise, I consider the concept of neighborhood propensity as a black box that begs the central 
question of what explanatory mechanisms link past and present.           
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effects.”  We have methods for the analysis of crime trajectories, to be sure, but what I am after 
is their explanation at the individual and neighborhoods levels. What we need then is a life 
course of place and a more rigorous assessment of history in the form of prior neighborhood 
contexts and how they are revealed in the current lives of both individuals and neighborhoods.   
 
THE DILEMMA OF RACE AND THE NEW DIVERSITY 
The facts about legacies of inequality bring into sharp relief the next big problem: Criminology 
has not developed a clear understanding or policy solution to profound disparities in criminal 
violence by race. Racial disparities in crime and criminal justice processing may even be 
growing. In the first six months of 2012, for example, 201 of the 259 homicide victims in 
Chicago were African-American, nearly 78 percent even though blacks make up only a third of 
the city's population (Heinzmann 2012).  Perhaps more stark, almost 70% of black males with 
less than a high school education will spend time in prison, making incarceration an 
expected  part of the life course (Pettit and Western 2004).   
One stab at an explanation was offered fifteen years ago, when William Julius Wilson 
and I proposed a theory of race and urban inequality to explain the disproportionate 
representation of African Americans as victims and offenders in violent crime (Sampson and 
Wilson 1995).  Our thesis was that community-level patterns of racial inequality give rise to the 
concentration of the truly disadvantaged, which in turn leads to structural barriers and cultural 
adaptations that undermine social organization and ultimately the control of crime. We pursued 
this logic to argue that the community-level causes of violence are the same for both whites and 
blacks—known in the literature as the “racial invariance” thesis—but that racial segregation by 
community differentially exposes members of minority groups to violence-inducing and        
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violence-protecting social mechanisms, explaining black-white disparities in violence.  I will not 
attempt a detailed review here, but I think it is fair to say that the evidence is supportive —there 
is wide variability in crime rates among white and black communities with robust similarity in 
key predictors (Krivo and Peterson 2000).  Neighborhood factors correlated with race also 
explain a significant proportion of the black-white racial gap in violence among individuals 
(Sampson, 2012: 249). 
The problem, however, is that spatial inequality by race and place makes fair 
comparisons between whites and blacks almost impossible. Almost a third of black children in 
Chicago live in the upper quartile of concentrated disadvantage—for whites the percentage is 
zero.
13 At the upper end, white working-class areas do better than the highest-income black 
neighborhoods when it comes to the economic status of near neighbors, and spatial advantage 
extends to social interactional and criminal justice processes. For example, among 
neighborhoods with high collective efficacy, almost 100% of predominantly white 
neighborhoods were situated near other high-efficacy neighborhoods compared to less than half 
of black or Latino neighborhoods.
 Spatial incarceration differentials are even more disparate 
(Sampson, 2012: 114).  Because of larger processes of segregation and migration, then, even 
when African American neighborhoods (and, to a lesser extent, Latino neighborhoods) generate 
collective efficacy, or when they achieve middle-class status, their residents still face the added 
challenge of being situated in a wider environment characterized by social and criminal justice 
disadvantage.  The situation of white neighborhoods is nearly the opposite—even when they are 
at high risk because of internal characteristics, their residents benefit from nearby areas.  
Although I hypothesize that spatial inequality in both disadvantage and social processes are 
                                                 
13. Sampson et al. (2008).  Comparing black with white neighborhoods in segregated American cities is 
thus to compare apples and oranges on key predictors of violence (see also Peterson and Krivo 2010).  
Poor black neighborhoods for the most part have no white counterparts (Sampson, 2012: 249).        
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central to explaining racial disparities, “counterfactual” tests of this thesis are hard to achieve 
because of the very inequalities at issue.   
IMMIGRATION AND THE CHANGING CITY 
  Not only do racial disparities and inequalities remain, black-white distinctions are not 
sufficient for 21
st century America.  A new reality of ethnic diversity has emerged, bringing with 
it further questions and puzzles.  Latino Americans are now the largest minority group at almost 
15 percent of the population, and immigration has neared peak levels historically. Reaching a 
demographic “tipping point,” minority babies also now outnumber white infants according to 
projections from the U.S. Census  (Frey 2011)—whites are thus in line to become the nation's 
minority in the not too distant future.  Perhaps unexpectedly, the United States is not only 
increasingly diverse in our nation’s cities, but in suburbs and rural towns as well. 
   As the historian Michael Katz (2012: 100) has recently argued, the explosion of 
immigration has “irrevocably smashed the black/white frame.”  Indeed, immigration has 
reshaped America and is now reshaping the world in ways that demand criminological attention.  
Once again the puzzles are big:  why are first-generation immigrants, who are disproportionately 
poor, less likely to be involved in crime and violence than the better-off native born?  What is the 
macro-level effect of immigration on U.S .crime rates?  Although the Sampson-Wilson thesis has 
focused mainly on blacks and whites, can the “racial invariance” thesis be applied to ethnicity 
and crime? What role does spatial context play in the new immigration and patterns of diversity?  
For the May issue of the Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social 
Science, John MacDonald and I commissioned some of the most meticulous research to date 
about the effects of immigration on a cross section of American communities—urban, suburban 
and rural (MacDonald and Sampson 2012). The scholars who participated were in agreement:        
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while new immigrants are poorer than the general population and face considerable hardship, 
there is no evidence that they have reshaped the social fabric in harmful ways.  Combined with 
findings in Great American City, I would further hypothesize that the large influx of ﬁrst-
generation immigrants may reﬂect a diffusion process with spillover effects or externalities, such 
as economic renewal in formerly poor areas and the diffusion of nonviolent social mores.  
Consider, for example, the finding that first-generation immigrants in Chicago commit almost 50 
percent less violence than the third generation, after accounting for their greater poverty and 
differences along a long list of relevant social characteristics (e.g., income, marital status, and 
even individual IQ).  Not only are recent immigrants (whether white, black, or Latino) less 
violent, there appears to be a protective contextual effect of concentrated immigration. 
Moreover, increases in immigration at the neighborhood level are linked to decreases in 
violence, especially in poorer areas and those with histories of racial segregation and exclusion 
(Sampson, 2012: 251-259).  
Integrating the ANNALS volume and independent recent papers, I would thus argue that 
immigration is either benign with respect to the social fabric or directly linked to crime declines 
in neighborhoods, cities and perhaps at the national level.  This hypothesis remains to be fully 
assessed, however, and the racial invariance thesis is less clear when it comes to Latinos.  My 
reading of the data is that while homicide among Latino Americans follows the same general 
pattern as among blacks and whites in terms of the predictive power of concentrated 
disadvantage, other predictors of Latino violence may well be unique.
14  Thus it appears that 
while the racial invariance thesis can be extended to ethnic variations in community-level 
                                                 
14.  The fine-grained distinctions often made in tests of racial invariance may be unduly optimistic. The 
ratio of signal to noise in crime data is typically too low to focus on much more than qualitative inference 
(e.g., are relationships in the same direction and significant?).  Many tests of invariance also fail to 
account for the fact that when many factors are analyzed, by chance alone we should expect differences.          
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disadvantage and violence, there are differences by other characteristics and the number of 
studies is small (Steffensmeier et al. 2010).  The problem of immigrant exposure to the U.S. over 
time is also a big question: Will lower crime rates in the first and second generation endure? 
  Increases in diversity and immigration remain a criminological challenge for another 
reason.  Residents perceive more disorder when there are more immigrants (Sampson 2012, 
chapter 6), and Robert Putnam has provided sobering evidence that neighbors are less trusting 
the more diverse their neighborhoods (Putnam 2007).  At the international level, changes in 
welfare provisions tend to decline as societies become more diverse, and we have seen an 
increase in social division in the Netherlands, France, and other European countries as a result of 
immigration and diversity. Substantial social and population change is also turning cities inside 
out and calling into question traditional urban and criminological models.  For example, poverty 
is increasingly concentrated in the suburbs, wealth is concentrating in the center cities, and 
gentrification is reshaping many formerly working class and poor areas. U.S. cities are in essence 
becoming more like many European cities such as Paris. Ehrenhalt (2012) has called this process 
“The Great Inversion.”   Although I argue the evidence suggests demographic “revision” is more 
apt than inversion, we do need to revise (or discard) the notion of “inner city” and consider the 
many implications of changing diversity for crime and justice (Kirk and Laub 2010).    
  In sum, cities and neighborhoods are rapidly changing with respect to diversity and 
immigration.  The increasing presence of “global neighborhoods” (Logan and Zhang 2010)  
opens up a new set of challenges along with the unsolved problems of race and inequality that 
have long plagued American cities and criminal justice in America. I submit that a focus on 
neighborhood context, social mechanisms, and spatial inequality is part of the solution.  
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COGNITION AND CONTEXT 
Historically, neighborhood research has been driven by structural theories and “objective” 
indicators such as concentrated poverty and inequality. While this work remains central, many 
researchers have become increasingly convinced that cultural and cognitive factors play a key 
role. In recent years the sociology of culture has argued for the role of concepts such as framing, 
meaning, collective narratives, stigma, and cultural capital in studying low-income urban 
populations (Kirk and Papachristos 2011; Small et al. 2010).  This intellectual move is notable 
given the famous critique of cultural explanation in criminology by Kornhauser (1978).  
  Drawing on principles 3-5, I advocate in Great American City for a revised conception of 
the role of cultural meaning in our understanding of neighborhood context.  In one application I 
focus on symbolic processes and collective perceptions in our conception of neighborhood 
disorder.   My argument leads me to revisit a core assumption of the “broken windows” thesis: I 
claim that one broken window (appearance) does not necessarily lead to another broken window 
and in turn future crime (reality).  Rather, it depends on where the broken window exists and the 
larger social meanings associated with that context.  Physical cues in themselves are ambiguous. 
  Several facts support this argument. First, among those living in the same neighborhood, 
people differed significantly in how much they viewed disorder as a problem. Second, 
perceptions were systematically shaped by social position, such as education, race, class, and 
age.  Race is particularly salient — whites see disorder as more of a problem than blacks, 
Latinos, and Asians, even when living in the same environment (see also Hipp 2010). Third, I 
showed that immigrant concentration and the presence of a large population of African 
Americans lead all racial/ethnic groups to view disorder as problematic—regardless of how 
much observed or measured disorder there is in the neighborhood (which we meticulously        
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assessed by videotaped observations and based on inter-rater agreement). This finding 
undermines the common view that seeing is simply a function of what is there, optically 
speaking, within error and barring perceptual deficit.  Just as memory is dependent on context, so 
is what we “see.”   
  The more general takeaway is that it is not only “disorder” itself that matters but how it is 
perceived as a problem.  This proposition can be integrated with the broken windows thesis—in 
fact norms of disorder and order are part of the original theory and subsequent major statements 
(Skogan 1990).  But the context and production of shared meanings have been taken as largely 
unproblematic, which is ironic given the history of the broken windows thesis.  In the field 
experiment conducted by Philip Zimbardo (2007) in the 1960s that Wilson and Kelling (1982) 
cite in their original article, a purposely abandoned car in a Bronx neighborhood was ravaged 
within minutes by vandals. Zimbardo’s team recorded more than 20 destructive incidents on the 
car overall. By contrast, in a Palo Alto neighborhood nothing happened for five days until the 
researchers themselves started smashing the car’s windows.  Zimbardo also reports that one day 
when it began to rain in Palo Alto a passerby lowered the hood of the abandoned car — “God 
forbid the engine should get wet!” (Zimbardo 2007: 25)   
  Thus context was everything even at the dawn of broken windows theory—the same cue 
of disorder, primed by design to be identical, nonetheless triggered vastly different responses 
depending on the neighborhood.  According to Zimbardo, the Bronx was characterized by 
distrust, cynicism, and “anonymity of place” (2007:304), what I interpret as a kind of “no man’s 
land” compared to Palo Alto’s watchful eyes and norms of ownership of public space.
15  Norms 
                                                 
15. Wilson and Kelling (1982) also note the anonymity and apparent “no one caring” in the Bronx 
compared to the “mutual regard” of Palo Alto.         
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about order are inherently cognitive and contextual, conditioning responses to what are presumed 
to be objective markers of disorder.  
DISORDER AND LEGACIES OF INEQUALITY  
  The cognition-context link bears on the two problems I discussed above—legacies of 
inequality and race/ethnicity. Neighborhoods with high concentrations of minority, immigrant, 
and poor residents have historically been hard hit by structural problems of crime and capital 
disinvestment.  These persistent and very public processes are not mirages — they have deep 
roots in the concrete history of American stratiﬁcation and segregation, and are not likely to 
lapse in the face of short-term change or contrary evidence.  But perceptions take on a new life 
and persist when reinforced through social interactions, institutional practices, and collective 
reputations.  In particular, I show that shared perceptions of disorder—independent of 
observable visible cues (what we think of as “reality”)—form a meaningful social property of the 
environment that inﬂuences both individual and neighborhood-level outcomes, including the 
future poverty level of a neighborhood (controlling for its past poverty and present actual 
disorder).  I also show that an individual’s perception of disorder is most influenced not by the 
present level of observed disorder, his or her own characteristics, poverty, or even the racial 
composition of the neighborhood.  What matters most is the inter-subjective or shared prior 
beliefs of different residents formed years earlier — in other words, shared priors. 
  These findings reinforce the symbolic role of neighborhood I discussed earlier. 
Reputations are sticky and the categorization of neighborhoods as “bad” or “disorderly” (or 
conversely, “good”) carries weight that is transmitted over time through institutionalized 
practices.  Often neglected is that the police are at the forefront of dividing up the city into easily 
understood categories shaped by race and class, and their own visible presence in the community        
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may reinforce the priors of residents and further cement a neighborhood’s reputation as 
disorderly, potentially leading to further decline.  The self-fulfilling prophecy of stigmatization 
reflects what I call the looking-glass neighborhood (Sampson, 2012: 365).  The social-
psychological concept of the “looking-glass self” posits that a person’s individual self grows out 
of society’s interpersonal interactions and the perceptions of others.  Moving up a level, I argue 
that the looking-glass neighborhood is a mechanism that shapes the “appearance order” of the 
contemporary city.  As I show in the book, physical cues in a neighborhood are weakly related to 
its crime and future poverty trajectory once shared perceptions of disorder are controlled.  I 
therefore propose that collectively shaped perceptions of disorder, along with persistent legal 
cynicism, another cultural mechanism that I consider important but set aside,
16 are 
underappreciated social mechanisms behind the durable legacies of inequality I highlighted 
earlier.  According to this theoretical framework, cultural and structural mechanisms are part of 
the same dynamic historical processes rather than as rigidly competing ideas. 
  In sum, “seeing” or perceiving disorder is a heterogeneous process whereby residents 
impute meaning depending on the contexts and interactions they are observing, in addition to 
their own characteristics. Wikström et al. (2012) make a similar point on the importance of the 
perception process, although in their view individual morality is of greater interest.  Regardless 
of the specific hypothesized mechanism, criminology faces a challenge of integrating cultural 
mechanisms, cognition, and context that will require a new infusion of research. This challenge 
bears directly on the next theme I take up, the role of norms and collective efficacy. 
                                                 
16. In communities with high legal cynicism and the perceived irrelevance of moral rules, violence is 
higher. This association is reinforced by disadvantage, suggesting a feedback loop that feeds further 
cynicism and behavior outside of the law (for example, using violence to settle disputes).  Recent research 
shows that legal cynicism helps explain the persistence of violence in certain communities and racial 
disparities in violence (Kirk and Papachristos 2011; Sampson 2012; Sampson and Bartusch 1998).  




COLLECTIVE EFFICACY IN A COSMOPOLITAN WORLD 
Born of classic social disorganization theory (Bursik 1988; Kornhauser 1978) and the Chicago 
School of urban sociology (Short 1971), collective efficacy refers to processes of informal social 
control and social cohesion among residents.  Our conception of collective efficacy (CE) was 
accompanied by a theoretically driven measurement strategy that tapped both behavior and 
norms—the “ecometrics” of CE as it were.  Resident-based reports of trust, helping behavior, 
and the collective willingness to do something about public problems all clustered together at the 
neighborhood level and were measured reliably by a summary scale.  In neighborhoods that were 
otherwise similar, those with higher levels of collective efficacy had lower rates of crime. This 
general finding was replicated in Stockholm, Sweden and it arises in a number of other 
international contexts, suggesting that Chicago is not unique.  Collective efficacy is also quite 
stable over time and predicts future variations and changes in crime, adjusting for neighborhood 
compositional differences.  Highly efficacious communities do better on other things as well, 
including birth weight, rates of teen pregnancy, and infant mortality, suggesting a general link to 
health. Whether rich or poor, white or black, I have therefore argued that collective efficacy 
signals a community on a trajectory of wellbeing. 
  Many questions nonetheless remain.  One is measurement related: How is collective 
efficacy best measured?  My answer is that collective efficacy is a theory of process and not 
simply a measure. For example, different measures of cohesion are possible and I certainly think 
future research should not be strictly bound by our original operationalization.
17 I would 
                                                 
17.  For example, there is some dispute whether control and cohesion yield a single construct or can be 
separated. The evidence seems to range from moderately strong correlations (e.g., in range of .6) to strong 
correlations (over .8).  Although I would not expect cohesion and control to be tightly coupled in all 
contexts, estimating independent effects of theoretically similar indicators that are correlated highly and        
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emphasize, however, that one of the distinguishing features of collective efﬁcacy theory is a 
focus on the activation and content of social ties, not just network density.  Influenced by 
Bandura’s (1997) emphasis on human agency in self-efficacy, dense personal or even 
acquaintanceship ties may facilitate collective efﬁcacy, but they are not posited as sufﬁcient and 
therefore do not form the deﬁnitional core of the concept.  Acts such as helping neighbors and 
exchanging advice are examples of activated ties and thus more akin to social cohesion.
18  
I would further emphasize that collective efficacy theory is distinguished by its focus on 
informal norms of control in public spaces. Extending the concept of efficacy articulated by 
Bandura (1997), I view shared expectations of conduct in a social setting as tapping the latent 
capacity for action.  Measuring only behavioral acts of control (or order) confounds norms with 
inducements and opportunities for their execution. As Erving Goffman (1971: 97) argues, social 
norms are rooted in shared expectations and perceived codes of conduct that arise in the context 
of everyday interactions (see also Horne 2001: 4).  A key argument of collective efficacy theory 
is that it matters what I think others think, making collective efficacy a kind of deterrence or 
moral rule—a generalized mechanism of “common knowledge” that goes beyond any single act 
                                                                                                                                                           
measured with error is uncertain in meaning.  There is the additional question of the link between the 
willingness or intent to intervene and actual control. Wickes et al. (2012) find that norms of collective 
efficacy in Brisbane, Australia do not predict acts of informal control.  Their analysis is conducted only 
among those respondents who define disorder as a “big” problem, however, and they control for 
reciprocated exchange (or, arguably, “cohesion”).  For these reasons the result is perhaps  not 
surprising—expectations of control are likely to predict lower perceptions of disorder in Brisbane as in 
Chicago (compare footnote 20), and if so, an analysis only in “big problem” areas and that controls for 
dimensions of cohesion is by design removing significant variation in collective efficacy.    
 
18. In the PHDCN data, the cohesion scale includes reports of whether residents are “willing to help 
neighbors” or “get along with each other” and is correlated .7 with the scale of reciprocated exchange at 
the neighborhood level but less than .3 with the density of friend/kinship ties, again substantiating the 
distinction between systemic ties and their activation. In past work I have thus considered  reciprocated 
exchange (and intergenerational closure) to be interrelated dimensions of a community’s collective 
efficacy for children (Sampson et al. 1999).  Alternatively, one could view the sequence of exchange or 
cohesion leading to social control as describing the overall causal process of collective efficacy. 




19  “Don’t Snitch,” for example, is a social norm about not intervening or contacting 
the authorities, a form of anti-collective efficacy that can co-exist with strong personal ties and is 
likely reinforced by neighborhood social interactions.  
 In sum, collective efficacy is an overarching construct and causal process involving 
shared expectations about order and control, activated ties, and acts of informal control.  How 
these concepts are measured and inter-relate will vary depending on the research context.
20 
THE ROLE OF ORGANIZATIONS AND TECHNOLOGY 
Another question I am often asked is: how is collective efficacy produced or induced?  
Although there is no easy answer, one solution is organizations.  The evidence in Chicago 
reveals that the density of nonprofit organizations in a community is directly related to higher 
collective efficacy, controlling for economic status and friendship ties.  One reason is that shared 
expectations and trust appear to be enhanced by the collective activities of organizations such as 
neighborhood block groups, tenant associations, and after-school centers. As Mario Small (2009) 
has argued, simple activities like childcare are often undertaken in organizational settings that 
create unanticipated opportunities that expose parents to collective goals like fundraising or 
helping to plan group activities. Consistent with Small, I hypothesize that nonproﬁt organizations 
                                                 
19. This analytic distinction and the idea of collective efficacy as a moral context  has been taken up in 
the recent work of Wikström and colleagues in testing situational action theory (Wikström et al. 2012: 
143).   
 
20.  In the PHDCN data, high collective efficacy predicts future perceptions of low disorder controlling 
for structural characteristics, concurrently observed disorder, and prior perceptions of disorder.  The 
reverse does not hold.  Based on this pattern and the present theoretical framework, one might view 
perceived disorder as either a) an indicator of shared norms of order (e.g., Ross and Mirowsky 1999: 413) 
and hence a kind of negative collective efficacy or moral reliability (Skogan, 1990: 48), or b) as a 
mediator of collective efficacy in a developmental  process.  Logically, if disorder indicates loss of 
control, then the loss of control comes first, making option b a reasonable integration of collective 
efficacy and broken windows theory. My concern with prior research is equating cues that we can 
systematically measure with norms or subjective beliefs about order (Raudenbush and Sampson, 1999).  
If norms of (dis)order explain crime more than or as much as observed incidents of disorder, which 
appears to be the case (Sampson 2012: 147), a revised broken windows thesis is necessary.  The devil, as 
always, is in the details.        
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and the maintenance of organizational resources generate a web of routine activities that 
lubricate collective life, although seldom planned as such. This externality is important in large 
cities where we can only know or socialize with a tiny proportion of our neighbors based on 
personal effort alone.  The organizational effect on collective efﬁcacy and its distinction from 
dense personal ties leads me to suggest that perhaps the more accurate conceptualization in the 
contemporary city is “cosmopolitan efﬁcacy” (Sampson, 2012: 367-370). 
  Nonproﬁt organizations and their unintended consequences provide a promising way to 
think about intervention and the response to collective challenges. There is evidence outside of 
criminology, for example, that a variety of neighborhood organizations have emerged to help 
rebuild New Orleans after the devastation of Hurricane Katrina, triggering collective efﬁcacy and 
city renewal at the ground level.  Revising somewhat my earlier emphasis on the task specific 
versus general nature of collective efficacy, I think there is evidence that organizationally 
induced social capital and collective efficacy are surprisingly general in orientation, especially in 
responses to natural disasters (Aldrich 2012).  I thus hypothesize that helping responses to 
exogenously induced threats (such as a hurricane, heat wave, or unexpected crime surge) will be 
greater in neighborhoods with high collective efficacy than in low collective efficacy areas.    
  One implication is that it is not just about any one type of organization but more the 
diversity of organizations and their interconnections.  Consistent with this prediction, I show that 
communities with a high density of churches but with a low presence of other organizations or 
interlocking connections were lower in trust than the more “secular” communities.  I also 
showed that the cohesion among the network of organizational leaders was positively related to 
collective efficacy, net of economic and racial composition.  These findings are another reason to 
argue that personal ties among residents are not the only pathway to collective efficacy. Drawing        
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on principles 3, 7 and 8, I thus hypothesize that a diverse breadth of organizations and cross-
cutting networks that tie them together lead to a more collectively efficacious neighborhood.    
Technology and the sorts of “big data” I discussed earlier can also play a role. There is 
growing evidence that the boom in social media and networks that connect users globally does 
not undermine local connections. “Wired” residents are physically concentrated by neighborhood 
(Sampson 2012: 18) and they are disproportionately connecting about local community 
(Hampton and Wellman 2003).  This ironic fact has broad import: citizens can now report on 
their smart phones not just crime but the elements of “broken windows” and a broad array of 
urban conditions.  As noted earlier, we can use such data to tap citizen engagement and 
custodianship over public spaces. Moreover, many nonprofit organizations and city governments 
now use web-based tools to enhance neighborhood connections, and some high-tech companies 
are building social network platforms to enhance opportunities for neighboring and the capacity 
to collectively solve local problems—again leading to a form of cosmopolitan efficacy.     
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
  A final and perhaps unconventional question is what role can the police play in building 
collective efficacy?  There has been considerable speculation about community policing and how 
the police should better work with the community.  But which “community” and what 
organizations should they partner with and how?  What about power differentials and the strong 
distrust of police and overall legal cynicism among residents of persistently disadvantaged 
neighborhoods (Kirk and Matsuda 2011; Kirk and Papachristos 2011)?  Can legitimate policing 
build trust?  Although fraught with tension, a major problem to solve going forward is to figure 
out how criminal justice organizations can increase efficacy and reduce cynicism among 
residents, especially among those with the most contact with the law and distrust of authorities.         
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Bringing ex-offenders into the process of building collective efficacy is an especially hard but 
essential challenge. 
 
HIGHER-ORDER STRUCTURES  
One of the main criticisms of the original Chicago School of urban sociology is that it treated the 
neighborhood as an isolated entity (or “natural area”) and ignored politics (Logan and Molotch 
1987) and the State (Wacquant 2008).  Although not entirely accurate, this critique is legitimate 
and given added merit in contemporary cities with highly bureaucratic entities, where 
organizations and their interests fundamentally shape the distribution of resources and evolution 
of neighborhoods.  It follows that political forces and cross-cutting neighborhood networks and 
organizational ties are potentially just as important as internal neighborhood characteristics.  
Spatial models are one solution to get us outside the neighborhood proper, but they remain 
within the framework of between-community analysis.  Hence my last hard problem: 
neighborhoods are part of a complex, higher-order social and political system. 
  The problem is at once theoretical and methodological.  A vision of higher-order 
structures and processes does not conform to inﬂuential accounts in the social sciences of 
“methodological individualism” that posit individual choice as the foundation of explanation.  I 
accept the causality of individual action, to be sure, but I argue that neighborhood processes and 
higher-order structures have their own logic and causality. And while I make no claim that 
neighborhood-level processes are necessarily the most important, like a cog, they mediate 
bottom-up and top-down mechanisms for many social phenomena.  Unlike a hierarchical model, 
this conceptualization suggests an underlying process that produces chains of effects at all        
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levels—causal processes do not inherently begin at the top or bottom.  I thus argue that 
neighborhoods have downward and upward reaching inﬂuences, not just “side to side.”  
  Although hard to study and no one can simultaneously unpack all the moving parts, I 
believe the evidence supports the conclusion that individual selection is both a neighborhood 
effect and embedded in a process of higher-order “structural sorting,” bringing full circle the 
integration of individual choice, neighborhood processes, and citywide structure. In particular, I 
found that neighborhood selection is directly linked to past and present neighborhood 
characteristics, controlling for individual confounders.  I also showed that residential mobility 
ties across neighborhoods and network ties among elites—community leaders in law, business, 
politics, law enforcement, religion and education—are not only a function of internal 
neighborhood-level processes and spatial proximity but instead link multiple neighborhoods 
across often far-ﬂung sections of the city.  Consistent with my initial definition, neighborhoods 
are thus simultaneously embedded in larger communities and a metropolitan social structure.  
CONTEXTUAL CAUSALITY 
  The catch is that neither experiments nor advanced statistics are a simple solution to this 
kind of causation, nor, I argue, to social life in general.  Consider, for example, the influential 
idea of an unbiased estimate of a single causal parameter, usually at the individual level and 
often with individuals “nested” within neighborhoods, with the added assumption of 
independence or lack of social connections among neighborhoods. Yet the hierarchy and 
assumption of independence collapse when causality cuts across units and levels.  Unlike 
medical treatments that approximate a closed system, human behavior in social settings is 
interdependent—nothing is ever truly “held constant.”  Although recognition of interdependence 
and interaction effects is not a new insight, I believe I have offered credible evidence that much        
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of social life is interdependent in underappreciated spatial forms, with enduring force, and in 
cross-cutting ways.  Studying this kind of interlocking social world over time demands a 
theoretical stance and multifaceted analytic approach different than the stylistic version of much 
contemporary research, in which neighborhood effect is taken to mean the statistical or 
experimental “downward” effect of a speciﬁc neighborhood characteristic on some individual 
behavior (or even neighborhood unit) usually at one point in time.  
Rejecting methodological individualism as the dominant paradigm for criminology, I 
argue that while individuals are the ultimate actors, causality resides at the social level.  Here I 
side with disciplines such as public health and demography—the real action for the problems I 
have addressed is at the level of institutions, networks, shared cognition, and populations. The 
State’s political role in amplifying or attenuating neighborhood effects is also important to 
incorporate (Wacquant, 2008).  To confront causality in complex dynamic systems and the 
higher-order structures within which individuals and neighborhoods are embedded is the hardest 
problem of all I have tackled in this address, but the idea of contextual causality offers exciting 
opportunities for the development of new models of explanation and ultimately the design of 
holistic place-based interventions—the agenda of neighborhood translational criminology.
21   
 
CONCLUSION 
In this address I have covered a number of problems and puzzles that I consider important for 
criminologists to tackle. These have ranged widely and many may seem daunting.  Issues such as 
                                                 
21.  For an attempt to integrate neighborhood and interlocking or higher-order structures and a discussion 
of the implications for placed-based interventions, see Sampson (2012: Chapters 13-14 and 17).  
Promising analytic approaches include the use of agent-based models of neighborhood change (Bruch and 
Mare 2006) and comparative methods for “conjunctural causality” (Ragin 1987) that allow for 
heterogeneity in causal processes over time.  I plan in a future paper (Sampson and Winship 2013) to 
tackle methods of contextual causality in greater depth and explore implications for how to think about 
the implementation and evaluation of criminal justice policy.        
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the reproduction of inequality, how to define and what produces collective efficacy, race and 
crime, the changing city, immigration and the new diversity, cognition and context, politics, and 
social causality in complex systems—these are clearly not simple problems and no one study or 
empirical test is possible.  But I hope to have offered a unified framework that by “relentlessly 
focusing on context” and guided by a set of associated principles, will point to possible solutions.   
  At the same time, I believe the identification of hard unsolved problems is an equally 
important part of the scientific process.  There is precedent for my optimism. In the summer of 
1900, the German mathematician David Hilbert delivered a lecture in Paris that came to motivate 
the field of mathematics for decades to come.  In his simply titled address, “Mathematical 
Problems,” Hilbert presented 23 problems at the leading edge of mathematics that he thought 
would take a century or more to solve, what later became known as “Hilbert Problems.” Some of 
Hilbert’s problems were so hard they are still being worked on, as he predicted. But Hilbert was 
not a pessimist.  He believed that unsolved questions were the hallmark of a discipline with 
vitality and his vision was almost impossibly optimistic, radical even.  Consider his argument: 
“Is this axiom of the solvability of every problem a peculiarity characteristic of 
mathematical thought alone, or is it possibly a general law inherent in the nature of the 
mind, that all questions which it asks must be answerable?...This conviction of the 
solvability of every mathematical problem is a powerful incentive to the worker. We hear 
within us the perpetual call: There is the problem. Seek its solution.” (Hilbert 1902: 445). 
Lo and behold many of Hilbert’s hard problems were soon solved.  Others took more than a half 
century but were ultimately solved.  While some problems are still unresolved to this day, what 
is inspiring about Hilbert was the bold claim motivating his challenge.         
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  Criminology has its own set of hard problems, some that have long stymied us like race 
and crime, while others are fresh, like the challenges imposed by the new diversity and the 
diverging fates of American cities. But social problems are not like math—they are much harder!  
So it is with some trepidation that I end where I began, on an optimistic note.  By offering a set 
of hard problems, I am assuming, like Hilbert, that they are to be embraced and have the capacity 
to energize us for the future.  I confess to worries about the individual-level narrowness of much 
current scholarship, but I retain a faith in criminology’s intellectual vitality and capacity, and I 
believe a turn to a truly contextual criminology will advance our knowledge. I thus encourage a 
new generation of scholars to venture forth with a renewed sensitivity to the hard problems of 
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